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1. Introduction 
Traditional Supply Chain Management (SCM) is concerned with the flow of raw materials 
and finished goods (Prahinski & Kocabasoglu, 2006). Today, the scope for SCM in the 
context of environmental sustainability has extended to include the reverse flow of unsold 
finished goods, parts and packaging materials from the point of consumption back to the 
organization or to the rework /refurbishing vendors (Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001). With 
the rise in environmental awareness, many companies have started to reduce waste, recycle, 
and refurbish their products for a more sustainable future. Governments in many countries 
are starting to develop clearer and stricter environmental regulations on issues such as the 
disposal of chemical waste, clean production, and carbon emissions. For example, firms in 
Europe are expected to “take-back” the environmentally hazardous products and packaging 
for recycling or reuse (Kumar & Putnam, 2008).  
Today, reverse logistics has been adopted significantly by the automotive and aerospace 
spare parts markets as well as the electronics and computer hardware markets. The practice 
of reverse logistics offers several advantages to a company in terms of both tangible and 
intangible benefits. First, companies are able to retrieve defective equipments and parts 
which are either salvaged or refurbished and thus reclaim value out of the defective parts. 
Already, the annual value of commercial returns has exceeded US$100 billion (Stock et al., 
2002). Second, the packaging and defective materials are collected and recycled thereby 
generated scrap value back for the company. Companies have found more economic value 
in better managing the reverse supply chain (Stock et al., 2006). Third, in the eyes of the 
customer and society, the organization could gain a good standing and reputation of being a 
responsible company that takes care of hazardous wastes with effective corporate social 
responsibility policies. Thus, a supply chain that can differentiate the returned products 
early and recover timely valuable parts can yield a competitive advantage (Guide et al., 
2006).  
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In the consumer electronics sector, refurbished computers are sold at cheaper prices by all the 
leading brands and the demand for such laptops seems to be growing. The spare parts used by 
the computer manufacturers to service their products on warranty or on sale, include 
refurbished parts. Many electronic and consumer durable manufacturing companies offer buy 
back or exchange offer for the old equipment in lieu of the customer purchasing new 
equipment. However, managing the reverse logistics process is as operations intensive and 
complex as the forward supply chain, demanding the same focus and can involve multiple 
logistics partners such as 3PLs. Companies such as IBM, HP, Dell and Xerox have established 
deep processes and networks of refurbishing centres aligned with spare parts distribution 
centres. Unlike managing good parts inventory, defective spare parts require more handling 
and processes at the 3PL end. It has been commonly noticed that while the process demands 
defective parts to be returned in good condition, both the users and retailers do not pay 
enough attention to handling defective parts. Statistics suggest that defective parts suffer more 
damage in transit and handling than good parts.  
In the automotive and aerospace industries, reverse logistics is closely linked to spare parts 
management or service parts logistics. In the automobile industry, the profit margin of the 
after-sale service is much higher than that of selling new cars, particularly for cars in the low 
price /high volume segments (Maxton & Wormald, 2004). While manufacturers continue to 
face constant downward pressure due to the higher costs of materials, lower sales, and 
stiffer competition, the aftermarket business is able to maintain positive growth because of 
the consolidation in the market which produces economies of scale, and the fact that people 
are holding on to cars longer and therefore demand more replacement parts. Further, with 
the frequent vehicle recalls in recent years, an unfortunate side effect of rapid product 
innovation, the volume can be even higher than the annual sale as is the case of Toyota in 
2010 (Bensinger, 2010).  
In the aerospace industry, the extent of outsourcing by manufacturers is as high as 80% 
(Harney, 2005). Similarly, over 70 percent of a product's total value is created by suppliers in 
the automotive industry (Leenders et al., 2002). Many spare parts are with the supplier 
rather than the manufacturer. The management of outsourced supplies in both quality 
control and chain coordination is a critical issue for both forward and reverse SCM 
(Youngdahl et al., 2008). 
With the growing level of complexity connected to outsourcing, especially offshore 
outsourcing, many companies have considered and applied the option of outsourcing part 
of or their entire reverse supply chain to 3PLs. In the aerospace industry, many 
manufacturers have passed the responsibility of the maintenance, repair and overhaul to an 
OEM or a third party who specializes in the field. Service technologies have become so 
specialized that it makes sense to outsource to a specialist like Smart Signal, a company 
which makes systems that monitor the performance of plane engines to predict probable 
breakdowns (Harney, 2005). In the automotive industry, 3PLs are also heavily involved in 
reverse logistics such as shipping returned products. Some manufacturers also outsource the 
warehousing function of their spare parts to 3PLs as in the case of Embraer in Singapore 
(Haq, 2007). In general, 38% manufacturers have outsourced reverse logistics according to 
2009 14th Annual Third-Party Logistics Study (Langley, 2009). 
Some benefits of reverse logistics outsourcing include SCM cost reduction through 
leveraging on the 3PL’s pooled demand as well as its professional expertise and better 
operational or technology infrastructure for SCM functions. The focal firms can avoid huge 
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capital expenditures in facilities and enjoy the benefits of flexibility afforded by the 3PLs, 
which release them to focus on their core competencies (Li & Olorunniwo, 2008).  
Research to date has not investigated reverse supply chain governance with theoretical 
rigor. A realistic and rigorous examination on reverse logistics governance is valuable for 
both academia and practice. What are the advantages and weaknesses of third-party 
governance? For a manufacturer facing a complex reverse supply chain, should the firm 
choose outsourcing or invest in supply chain self governance to improve chain 
coordination? Which aspects of reverse supply chain should be outsourced to reduce cost 
and which should be kept in-house? How should the firm search for such a 3PL?  
This paper views reverse logistics outsourcing as a “buy” decision in SCM, similar to the 
ordinary outsourcing as a “buy” in the field of firm strategy. The make-or-buy problem is a 
fundamental issue in strategic management (Rumelt et al., 1994: 564), and various theories 
such as transaction cost economics (TCE) and resource-based view (RBV) can be applied. 
We propose a cost-value framework providing a comprehensive account to compare the 
benefits and costs of the make-or-buy decision in the context of reverse logistics so as to help 
the manufacturers evaluate the feasibility of reverse logistics outsourcing. This study 
contributes to the literature by providing a research framework on reverse logistics 
governance as well as practical suggestions for firms to improve on reverse supply chain 
collaboration and performance.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the outsourcing governance 
literature as well as some current practices. A research framework that systematically 
compares the relative benefits and cost of reverse logistics outsourcing versus a self-
managed reverse supply chain is then presented. Five sets of propositions are presented for 
further empirical investigation. The discussions and implications follow thereafter. 
2. Review on reverse logistics governance & research framework 
In a typical supply chain, a focal manufacturer procures from multiple suppliers and sends 
its products to multiple customers. Under globalization, these suppliers and customers can 
be located in faraway countries, and the manufacturer needs to find effective ways to 
manage the flow of goods along a disintegrated and dispersed supply chain. When 
customers decide to return the products or seek spare parts for repair, the manufacturer 
normally needs to coordinate with the 3PL(s) to ship the products or spare parts, and may 
further work with the suppliers if the spare parts are managed in-house. When firms 
outsource the management of the reverse supply chain, they can choose to outsource the 
logistics of its supplies or end-products, or the entire reverse supply chain of certain 
products. For example, UPS and FedEx as 4PLs have helped their clients in the electronics 
industry to manage their outbound logistics as well as their reverse logistics. Some 3PLs 
help high-tech manufacturers like Dell manage the inventory and product returns. While 
this paper discusses the governance of the entire reverse supply chain, it can be applied to 
part of the chain governance also. The firm can manage the overall reverse chain by itself 
but outsource the governance of one section to a third party.   
The manufacturer needs to consider three fundamental issues when selecting its reverse 
supply chain partners and the corresponding governance modes, namely, capability, past 
relationships, and uncertainty according to the management literature (e.g., Folta, 1998; 
Hoetker, 2005; Vivek et al., 2008). Hereafter, we focus on the impact of the industry and firm 
characteristics, and exclude the influence of past relationships which is relationship specific.    
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Various theories have been used to explore these issues. For instance, TCE focuses on the 
effect of transaction characteristics such as uncertainty and asset specificity on the associated 
governance costs. It then asks how the make-or-buy decision or another hybrid governance 
form such as joint ventures magnifies or diminishes that effect (Williamson, 1981; 
Williamson, 1991). From another lens, RBV looks at the partners’ technical capabilities and 
the potential synergies from combining the partners’ resources such as reducing redundant 
resources and knowledge exchange resulting in new capabilities (Barney, 1991; Madhok, 
2002). In addition, scholars have applied real option theory to technology sourcing and 
identified two types of uncertainty with different implications on governance costs: 
exogenous uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty largely unaffected by the actions of the partner such 
as technological uncertainty, and endogenous uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty can be decreased 
by action of the partner (Folta, 1998). While integration can reduce endogenous uncertainty, 
external equity collaboration is more effective in controlling exogenous uncertainty (Folta, 
1998; Van De Vrande et al., 2009).   
TCE is concerned with managing the exchange efficiently to minimize the total transaction 
cost and is based on the central assumption of firm opportunism (Williamson, 1991; 
Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Exchange attributes such as information asymmetry 
(Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993), asset specificity (Williamson, 1991), and performance 
measurement difficulty (Williamson, 1981) would influence the effectiveness of the 
governance mode, which ranges from a one-off contractual relationship (market), franchises, 
non-equity alliances, joint ventures, to full integration (hierarchy). An organization can 
deploy a variety of nonmarket or structural mechanisms, including bureaucratic 
administration to reduce the transaction cost and contain opportunism (Williamson, 1991). 
A zero transaction cost environment would lead to perfect market competition in which all 
exchanges would be executed by contracts while high transaction costs would bring in 
vertical integration and bureaucratic control. 
RBV starts from the heterogeneity of firms and asserts that the firm-specific resource is the 
primary reason for superior firm performance, which is built through an ongoing learning 
process (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Given the resource heterogeneity (resources that 
differ), imperfect mobility of assets (resources not easily moved between firms), ex post 
limits on competition, and ex ante limits on competition (limitations exist on competitive 
resource position and valuation), firms are able to maintain their competitive advantage in 
an imperfect market (Peteraf, 1993). However, firms operating in an uncertain environment 
are often difficult to discern which resources are critical for future success. Capability 
building through learning and experimentation is of paramount concern to them (Madhok, 
2002; Gans & Stern, 2003).  
Real option theory highlights the exogenous uncertainty beyond the control of firms such as 
environmental turbulence and technological newness (Van De Vrande et al., 2009). As these 
uncertainties largely resolve over time, it suggests that firms keep their options open when 
costs are high. Hybrid governance modes such as alliances can be seen as options for the 
focal firm to defer the internal development or acquisition of a targeted firm (e.g., Folta, 
1998; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). By deferring the full commitment, the firm can limit its 
exposure to any exogenous uncertainty while keeping a means to capitalize on growth 
opportunities and potential benefits (Folta, 1998).   
There are many studies applying these theoretical lenses to the context of outsourcing, 
especially supplier outsourcing, and some recent literature have made attempts in 
incorporating the key concerns of each body of them together. TCE and RBV literature have 
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been integrated in an empirical study on the sourcing decisions of notebook computer 
manufacturers for innovative flat-panel displays, and it is found that the relative importance 
of supplier capabilities, past relationships, and being an internal or external supplier, is 
contingent on the level of uncertainty posed by the desired innovative component (Hoetker, 
2005). In a longitudinal study of off-shoring relationships, it is reported that such 
relationships begin with calculative trust and opportunism, which later leads to resource-
based competency building and non-economic trust. It starts from transactional to resource 
complementarities, and finally to a phase where trust and long-term orientation governs the 
process (Vivek et al., 2009). 
When applying these theoretical perspectives to reverse logistics outsourcing, we use the 
transaction value approach to synthesize the multiple theories created (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
In contrast to uncertainty or time used before, transaction value is more rigorous and 
quantitative for general use. It is based on the premise that every governance mode comes 
with its own cost and value, and the manufacturer should maximize the net transaction 
value. Pure cost minimization may not be sufficient as the co-evolution of competencies in 
anticipation of value gains with supply chain partners could be the key for success in some 
industries (Madhok, 2002). The pursuit of greater joint value from collaboration may require 
a governance mode that is less cost efficient if the loss of efficiency is more than offset by the 
value created (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Similarly, as both endogenous and exogenous 
uncertainties exist, the manufacturer faces a trade-off between the need for administrative 
control and the cost of commitment (Folta, 1998). While superior administrative control 
could minimize opportunistic cost, the associated benefits may be offset by the opportunity 
cost of committing aggressively to certain reverse logistics technology which may lose value 
after the change in government regulations. The total cost minimization should thus 
consider both opportunistic and opportunity cost.  
We thus propose following framework to study the governance issue in reverse logistics. On 
the horizontal level, we examine relative benefits, relative relational cost (cost due to the 
conflict of interest in the supply chain), and relative external cost (cost due to external 
uncertainties such as the cost of early commitment). On the vertical level, we examine 
uncertainty and capabilities, including both stand-alone capabilities and capabilities of value 
creation from collaboration. We envision that this framework can aid in achieving a better 
understanding of the preferences of companies in the governance of their reverse logistics. 
Notwithstanding the industry and firm characteristics, we can derive the following general 
observations as bases for further theoretical development.  
• When an outsourcer has significant advantage over the manufacturer in the capabilities 
of managing reverse logistics, the manufacturer can obtain more benefits from 
outsourcing. 
• When there is significant value generated from collaboration with supply chain 
partners in reverse logistics, the manufacturer can obtain more benefits from self-
governing the supply chain as the chain governor would be the owner of these values. 
• While high uncertainty may increase conflicts of interest between the manufacturer and 
the supply chain partners in reverse logistics, increase the relational costs, and make 
self-governance the better governance mode, external uncertainty may render the 
commitment of the manufacturer such as facilities obsolete after the change in external 
environment such as the release of new government regulations. In such cases, 
outsourcing can reduce the costs of commitment and create more flexibility from the 
perspective of the manufacturer.  
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Transaction 
Characteristics 
Relative 
capabilities of 
outsourcer 
Capabilities of 
value creation 
from collaboration
Uncertainty 
Relative benefits More benefits of 
outsourcing if 
outsourcer is 
more capable 
Self-governance 
can retain more 
value created 
 
Relative 
relational costs 
  Self-governance can reduce 
relational costs when 
uncertainty is high 
Relative external 
costs 
  Outsourcing can reduce external 
costs when uncertainty is high 
Table 1. Research framework 
3. Theory & propositions 
We now study the governance mode choice in the context of reverse logistics from the 
perspective of the manufacturer by taking the industry and firm characteristics into 
consideration. Further elaboration of above framework is necessary for a detailed 
understanding of particular properties of the preference for self-governance and outsourcing. 
These topics are discussed in detail, in the following five sub-sections. 
3.1 Sectoral differences in the preferences for self-governance and outsourcing 
The literature on the modes of organization suggests a sector-specific understanding of the 
association between, on the one hand, the level of technological change in the sectors of 
industry, and, on the other hand, the form of the organization, be it integration through full 
ownership or inter-firm linkages through strategic technology alliances (Hagedoorn & 
Duysters, 2002; Van De Vrande et al., 2009). It is found that environments that induce or 
require a large degree of learning and flexibility, such as high-tech industries, will see a 
prevalence for alliances, whereas mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are dominant in the 
low-tech sectors of industry, where learning and flexibility is less important than in high-
tech industries. It is easy to understand as under the conditions of rapid technological 
change, as is the case of the high-tech industries, learning, organizational change, and quick 
strategic response ask for flexible organizational forms. More flexible forms of economic 
organizations, such as strategic alliances, are appropriate as new knowledge expires quickly 
and timely learning from partners appears more appropriate than control through a formal 
and hierarchical organization as such. Extending the logic to the governance of reverse 
logistics, we can similarly expect that the outsourcing of reverse logistics is preferred in 
high-tech industries. From the above framework, the rationale for outsourcing in high-tech 
industries include both the higher benefits from a more flexible governance mode which 
facilitate the value creation in collaboration as well as lower external cost due to the 
flexibility of outsourcing. In particular, as the time value of a returned high-tech product is 
relatively high, a reverse supply chain that can get returned products quickly tested for 
either resale or remanufacture would be valuable. An efficient reverse supply chain 
governed by a 3PL which can recover the value of returned products significantly would 
have clear advantage over a self-managed supply chain.   
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On the other hand, under the conditions of little technological change, as in the low-tech 
industries, companies demonstrate a preference for formal and well institutionalized modes 
of organization and control, such as M&As, to be the most appropriate form of external 
appropriation of innovative capabilities. In the context of reverse logistics, a self-managed 
supply chain would be preferred as control over relational costs would be more important 
compared to the benefits from a more flexible supply chain. Hence: 
Proposition 1a: For companies operating in a high-tech sector, the outsourcing of reverse supply chain 
governance would be relatively preferred as a mechanism for efficiency and flexibility.  
Proposition 1b: For companies operating in a low-tech sector, the self-governance of a reverse supply 
chain would be relatively preferred as a mechanism for better control. 
These propositions may explain the prevalence of the engagement of 3PLs in reverse 
logistics by high-tech firms. Facing high external uncertainty, passing the risky spare parts 
management to 3PLs would help the high-tech firms focus on their core competencies. Due 
to fierce competition in the market, manufacturers have to set very liberal return policies 
which increase the value of return products further (Rogers & Tibben-Lembke, 2001). An 
efficient return and recycle process would be valuable and professional 3PLs can meet 
perfectly such needs.   
3.2 Profitability differences in the preferences for self-governance and outsourcing 
In a normal organizational mode choice, firms would prefer M&As for activities in their core 
business as they would generate the necessary controls (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). In the 
context of reverse logistics, the core business factor could be translated to the profitability of 
the reverse supply chain compared to the overall firm profitability. A core business would be 
the main source of revenue and profit for a company and is thus more important to be 
protected from the potential loss of capabilities due to the opportunistic behaviour of partners. 
Here control is more important than flexibility as well as potential benefits from collaboration 
with external partners. Similarly, a reverse supply chain should be controlled by the 
manufacturer if it is the main source of profit. Leaving the management to externals would be 
highly risky and dangerous. Applying our framework, the relational costs of outsourcing a 
highly profitable supply chain would be extremely high. Self-management would be more 
appropriate. However, for a reverse supply chain with little profit or even losing money, it is 
natural for the manufacturer to pass the governance duty to external parties. Hence:  
Proposition 2a: For companies whose profits are largely from reverse logistics, the self-governance of a 
reverse supply chain is preferred as a mechanism for better control.  
Proposition 2b: For companies whose profits from reverse logistics are little compared to other 
sources, the outsourcing of a reverse supply chain is preferred as a mechanism for better efficiency. 
These propositions may explain the significant differences in reverse logistics governance 
between the automotive and aerospace industries while both industries are similar in product 
characteristics, supply chain structure, and have high demand for spare parts management. 
Both products are complex and require high engineering and manufacturing capabilities, and 
both can easily be broken down into major modules and systems. Both supply chains have a 
large base of suppliers organized in several tiers (part manufacturers, system integrators to 
sub-assembly suppliers) who supply to relatively few manufacturers. Both product lives are 
relatively long with strong demand for maintenance and spare parts and the service quality of 
reverse logistics is essential for the manufacturers (A.T. Kearney, 2003). 
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While the outsourcing of reverse logistics is common in the aerospace industry (Harney, 
2005), car manufacturers largely operate spare parts management by themselves. A key 
difference between the two industries is the profit margin of reverse logistics. Automotive 
manufacturers face steep competition, low growth, and a saturated mass market. The profit 
margin is very low, (the profit from selling new cars is typically less than 5%). On the other 
hand, the spare parts market enjoys a much higher margin and is an important source of 
profits for manufacturers. Though the task of managing thousands of different parts across 
hundreds of car models is challenging, the profit motivation is strong enough for 
manufacturers to invest and manage the reverse supply chain themselves. On the contrary, 
the manufacturers of aircrafts are still enjoying high profit from the limited competition and 
the technological advantage of incumbents like Boeing and Airbus is not likely to lose in the 
near future. According to the clockspeed theory, the aerospace industry is one of the slowest 
industries in industrial environment change (Fine, 1998). Hence, it is logical for these 
manufacturers to pass the spare parts management to capable 3PLs. 
3.3 Knowledge & service capabilities in the preferences for self-governance and 
outsourcing 
The knowledge needed for the management of reverse logistics affects the choice of 
governance mode significantly. It affects both the benefits and costs. On the benefits side, a 
manufacturer with sufficient knowledge of reverse logistics would prefer to self-manage the 
chain to save the trouble of searching for a capable 3PL governor as well as future 
negotiation costs. On the costs side, the less the knowledge base of the manufacturer on 
reverse logistics, the longer it will take to resolve the external costs amidst much 
uncertainty, making a higher level of commitment less attractive. Instead, it is prudent to 
first build familiarity through collaboration with more experienced partners such as the 
3PLs, through which the manufacturer creates an option while learning about the 
opportunity ahead (Folta, 1998). When the knowledge increases, direct involvement 
becomes more attractive. In other words, firms that are not yet familiar with reverse SCM 
will first have to learn from its partners before being able to accumulate the knowledge. 
Therefore, when the partnering firms have dissimilar knowledge bases, the need for 
learning and flexibility prevails over the need for administrative control (Van De Vrande et 
al., 2009). Moreover, the use of less integrated governance modes enables those same firms 
to reverse their commitments at lower sunk costs at any point in time.  
Besides the knowledge issue, service capabilities are important for the governance of reverse 
logistics, which would affect the relative benefits in the governance mode choice. The on-site 
inspection and maintenance as well as the on-time provision of spare parts are often 
important in reverse logistics. A manufacturer who is far away from the customer would 
naturally prefer to find local partners to help in after-sale services and reverse SCM. It may 
explain the reason for Embraer, an aircraft manufacturer based in Brazil, to engage a 3PL in 
Singapore to serve its customers in the Asia Pacific. Hence: 
Proposition 3a: For companies who are knowledgeable about reverse logistics, the self-governance of 
the reverse supply chain is preferred compared to companies not familiar with reverse logistics.  
Proposition 3b: For companies who are more capable of serving customers effectively, the self-governance 
of the reverse supply chain is preferred compared to companies less capable in serving customers. 
These propositions may yet be another reason for reverse logistics outsourcing in the high-
tech industry. Firms in high-tech industry normally specialized in developing commercially 
viable innovative products, and supply chain management is not their expertise. It is 
therefore logical for them to pass the duty of chain governance to a 3PL. 
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3.4 Pooling ability 
Reverse logistics is less standardized compared to the forward supply chain. Goods are less 
likely to be shipped in high volumes, and demand is more difficult to predict. Thus, the cost 
of managing reverse logistics is often higher than that of the forward supply chain. The 
pooling ability of the chain governor would be one important aspect of its capabilities and 
affect supply chain cost significantly. It can increase relative benefits in the transaction value 
analysis framework.    
In the governance of a forward supply chain, Li & Fung is a typical supply chain governor. It 
is a Hong Kong-based company which serves private label apparel firms in Europe and North 
America, and is known to operate as a “smokeless” factory by maintaining a large network of 
suppliers even though it does not own any factory. By using its buying power and trust 
developed with its supply base, Li & Fung is able to considerably shrink the delivery cycle of 
time sensitive products (Fung et al., 2008). The pooling effect is important in the supply chain 
management of Li & Fung, which keeps a rule of having at least 30% but not more than 70% 
business from a specific supplier to ensure sufficient leverage for supplier compliance but still 
keep its independence (Fung et al., 2008). However, different from leveraging as power in the 
forward supply chain, pooling in reverse logistics is more cost centred as it could significantly 
lower the supply chain cost. 3PLs thus often enjoy advantage over manufacturers as they are 
able to consolidate shipping orders from multiple manufacturers. Hence:  
Proposition 4: The stronger the pooling ability held by the third party over the manufacturer in 
reverse logistics, the more suitable it is for the third party to manage the reverse supply chain. 
A corollary from Proposition 4 is that small manufacturers are more likely to engage 3PLs 
(or large firms but having a small customer base in a region) while large firms would prefer 
to self manage the reverse supply chain.  
3.5 Regulatory uncertainty   
In contrast to a forward supply chain where the market force is the main external factor, the 
hands of governmental regulation are much more visible in reverse logistics. With 
increasing environmental awareness, governments, particularly those in developed 
countries, are pressing manufacturers and distributors to reduce the production of 
environmentally hazardous products and packages (Kumar & Putnam, 2008). For example, 
regulations on End-of-life Vehicles (ELV) Directive adopted by the European Union (EU) in 
2000 have motivated manufacturers like Volvo, Saab, and BMW to redesign their cars so 
that their components can be dismantled more efficiently (Kumar & Putnam, 2008).  
New government regulations can change the rule of the game significantly, and 
manufacturers have to comply to participate in the marketplace and often need to redesign 
their products and packaging to meet these requirements. Both forward and reverse supply 
chains could be affected and reverse supply chains tend to be exposed to greater regulatory 
uncertainty. Thus, the manufacturer must take the potential governmental intervention into 
consideration in the choice between self-governance and outsourcing. According to our 
framework, high external costs would lead to a preference for outsourcing. Hence: 
Proposition 5: The stronger the regulatory uncertainty in the industry within a region, the more suitable 
it is for a third party to manage the reverse supply chain. 
Regions such as the EU where governments tend to be global leaders for new environmental 
regulation face greater regulatory uncertainty. According to Proposition 5, manufacturers in 
industries with significant outputs of environmentally hazardous materials should 
outsource their reverse logistics in such regions. Table 2 summarizes the above propositions. 
www.intechopen.com
Supply Chain Management 
 
300 
Propositions 
(assumes the 
external 
governor is 
capable) 
Whether 
the firm is 
in high-
tech 
industries 
Whether 
reverse 
logistics is 
an 
important 
profit 
source 
Firm’s 
knowledge 
about reverse 
logistics 
Serving 
capabilities 
of the focal 
firm 
Pooling 
capabilities 
advantage 
of the third 
party 
Regulatory 
uncertainty 
Relative 
benefits 
If high-tech 
industry, 
more value 
from the 
third- party 
governance
If main 
profit 
source, 
more value 
preserved 
by self-
governance 
If knowledge-
able, more 
value in self-
governance 
If capable, 
more value 
in self-
governance
If 
significant, 
more value 
in third-
party 
governance 
 
Relative 
relational 
costs 
 If main 
profit 
source, 
lower 
relational 
costs by 
self-
governance 
If knowledge-
able, lower 
relational 
costs in self-
governance 
If capable, 
lower 
relational 
costs in 
self-
governance
  
Relative 
external 
costs 
If high-tech 
industry, 
lower 
external 
costs in 
third-party 
governance
 If knowledge-
able, lower 
external cost 
in self-
governance 
  If high, 
lower 
external 
costs in 
third-party 
governance 
Overall 
conclusion 
If high-tech 
industry, 
external 
third-party 
preferred; 
else, self-
governance 
preferred 
If main 
profit 
source, self-
governance 
preferred; 
else, third 
party 
preferred 
If knowledge-
able,  self-
governance 
preferred; 
else, third 
party 
preferred 
If capable, 
self-
governance 
preferred; 
else, third 
party 
preferred 
If the third-
party has 
pooling 
advantage, 
third party 
preferred; 
else, self-
governance 
preferred 
If 
regulatory 
uncertainty 
is high, 
third-party 
preferred; 
else, self-
governance 
preferred 
Table 2. Summary of Propositions 
4. Concluding remarks 
This chapter proposes a framework to examine the governance modes of reverse logistics. 
Drawing on perspectives from multiple organizational theories, we develop a general 
framework on the governance mode choice considering net transaction value which reflects 
relative benefits, relational costs and external costs. Applying the framework to the context 
of reverse logistics, we have generated five sets of propositions. External third-party 
governance is preferred when the industry is high-tech and when reverse logistics is not a 
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main profit source. When the manufacturer is knowledgeable or able to serve end-customers 
well, self-governance is preferred. When the third-party has significant pooling advantages 
over the manufacturer in reverse logistics, or when the regulatory uncertainty is high, third-
party governance is preferred. These propositions can explain some phenomena observed in 
various practices, and can be further investigated empirically. 
While the findings in this paper are preliminary, it suggests that the most appropriate 
governance mode for a reverse supply chain depends on the context of that chain. Practically, 
for the potential candidates of third-party governors such as 3PLs, they have to identify 
suitable reverse supply chains to involve and develop their capabilities accordingly. They 
should also manage their business carefully to consolidate sufficient pooling advantage over 
the manufacturers, such as having multiple customers in one industry and /or region.  
A manufacturer, with a complex reverse supply chain, has to analyze the chain characteristics 
to know if it is possible for an external third party to govern. If the chain is suitable, it needs to 
further identify a capable and trustful third-party governor to do so. However, if the reverse 
supply chain is unsuitable for third-party governance, either the manufacturer or a strong 
member in the chain should assume the role of the coordinator, improve its capabilities and 
closely collaborate with the other chain members to improve chain efficiency.  
5. References  
A.T. Kearney, I. (2003). Restructing the global aerospace industry. Retrieved from 
http://www.seaonline.org/docs/Restruct_aerospa-B5929.pdf 
Balakrishnan, S.& Koza, M. P. (1993). Information asymmetry, adverse selection and joint-
ventures. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 20, 99–117. 
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustainable competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1), 99-120. 
Bensinger, K. (2010). Toyota dealers to start fixing defective gas pedals. Los Angels Times. 
Fine, C. (1998). Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage. 
Perseus Books, Reading, MA. 
Folta, T. B. (1998). Governance and uncertainty: the trade-off between administrative control 
and commitment. Strategic Management Journal, 19(11), 1007–1028. 
Fung, V., Fung, W.& Wind, Y. (2008). Competing in a flat world: Building enterprises for a 
borderless world. Wharton School Pub, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Gans, J.& Stern, S. (2003). The product market and the market for “ideas”: 
commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy, 32(2), 
333-350. 
Guide, V. D. R. J., Souza, G. C., van Wassenhove, L. N.& Blackburn, J. D. (2006). Time value 
of commercial product returns. Management Science, 52(8), 1200-1214. 
Hagedoorn, J.& Duysters, G. M. (2002). External sources of innovative capabilities: the 
preference for strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Management 
Studies, 39(2), 167–188. 
Haq, R. (2007). Embraer outsources Singapore logistics hub. Arabian Business.Com. Retrieved 
from http://www.arabianbusiness.com/10598-embraer-outsources-singapore-
logistics-hub 
Harney, J. (2005). Suppliers fly up the value chain for airplane manufacturers. Outsourcing 
Journal. Retrieved from http://www.outsourcing-journal.com/jun2005b-
manufacturing.html 
www.intechopen.com
Supply Chain Management 
 
302 
Hoetker, G. (2005). How much you know versus how well I know you: Selecting a supplier 
for a technically innovative component. Strategic Management Journal 26, 75-96. 
Kumar, S.& Putnam, V. (2008). Cradle to cradle: Reverse logistics strategies and 
opportunities across three industry sectors. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 115(2), 305-315. 
Langley, J. (2009). The State of Logistics Outsourcing: 2009 third-party logistics: Georgia 
Institute of Technology. 
Leenders, M. R., Fearon, H. E., Flynn, A. E.& Johnson, P. F. (2002). Purchasing and Supply 
Management. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Li, X.& Olorunniwo, F. (2008). An exploration of reverse logistics practices in three 
companies. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 13(5), 381 - 386. 
Madhok, A. (2002). Reassessing the fundamentals and beyond: Ronald Coase, the 
transaction cost and resource-based theories of the firm and the institutional 
structure of production. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 535-550. 
Maxton, G.& Wormald, J. (2004). Time for a Model Change: Re-engineering the Global 
Automotive Industry. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Peteraf, M. A. (1993). The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view. 
Strategic Management Journal, 14(3), 179–191. 
Prahinski, C.& Kocabasoglu, C. (2006). Empirical research opportunities in reverse supply 
chains. Omega, 34(6), 519-532. 
Rogers, D. S.& Tibben-Lembke, R. S. (2001). An examination of reverse logistics practices. 
Journal of Business Logistics, 22(2), 129-148. 
Rumelt, R., Schendel, D.& Teece, D. (Eds.). (1994). Fundamental issues in strategy. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Stock, J., Speh, T.& Shear, H. (2002). Many happy (product) returns. Harvard Business Review, 
80(7), 16-17. 
Stock, J., Speh, T.& Shear, H. (2006). Managing product returns for competitive advantage. 
MIT Sloan Management Review, 48(1), 57-62. 
van de Vrande, V., Vanhaverbeke, W.& Duysters, G. (2009). External technology sourcing: 
The effect of uncertainty on governance mode choice. Journal of Business Venturing, 
24, 62-80. 
Vivek, S. D., Banwet, D.& Shankar, R. (2008). Analysis of interactions among core, 
transaction and relationship-specific investments: The case of offshoring. Journal of 
Operations Management, 26(2), 180-197. 
Vivek, S. D., Richey, G. J.& Dalela, V. (2009). A longitudinal examination of partnership 
governance in offshoring: A moving target. Journal of World Business, 44(1), 16-30. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), 
171-180. 
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction-cost approach. 
American Journal of Sociology, 87, 548-577. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete 
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269–296. 
Youngdahl, W., Ramaswamy, K.& Verma, R. (2008). Exploring new research frontiers in 
offshoring knowledge and service processes. Journal of Operations Management, 
26(2), 135–140. 
Zajac, E.& Olsen, C. (1993). From transaction cost to transaction value analysis: Implications 
for the study of interorganizational strategies. Journal of Management Studies, 30(1), 
131-145. 
 
www.intechopen.com
Supply Chain Management
Edited by Dr. pengzhong Li
ISBN 978-953-307-184-8
Hard cover, 590 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 26, April, 2011
Published in print edition April, 2011
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
The purpose of supply chain management is to make production system manage production process, improve
customer satisfaction and reduce total work cost. With indubitable significance, supply chain management
attracts extensive attention from businesses and academic scholars. Many important research findings and
results had been achieved. Research work of supply chain management involves all activities and processes
including planning, coordination, operation, control and optimization of the whole supply chain system. This
book presents a collection of recent contributions of new methods and innovative ideas from the worldwide
researchers. It is aimed at providing a helpful reference of new ideas, original results and practical experiences
regarding this highly up-to-date field for researchers, scientists, engineers and students interested in supply
chain management.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Qing Lu, Mark Goh and Robert De Souza (2011). Governance Mode in Reverse Logistics: A Research
Framework, Supply Chain Management, Dr. pengzhong Li (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-307-184-8, InTech, Available
from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/supply-chain-management/governance-mode-in-reverse-logistics-a-
research-framework
© 2011 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
